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Summary
The Anna Karenina principle is named after the opening sentence in the eponymous novel:
Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. The Two
Envelopes Problem (TEP) is a much-studied paradox in probability theory, mathematical
economics, logic, and philosophy. Time and again a new analysis is published in which
an author claims finally to explain what actually goes wrong in this paradox. Each author
(the present author included) emphasizes what is new in their approach and concludes that
earlier approaches did not get to the root of the matter. We observe that though a logical
argument is only correct if every step is correct, an apparently logical argument which goes
astray can be thought of as going astray at different places. This leads to a comparison
between the literature on TEP and a successful movie franchise: it generates a succession
of sequels, and even prequels, each with a different director who approaches the same basic
premise in a personal way. We survey resolutions in the literature with a view to synthesis,
correct common errors, and give a new theorem on order properties of an exchangeable pair
of random variables, at the heart of most TEP variants and interpretations. A theorem on
asymptotic independence between the amount in your envelope and the question whether
it is smaller or larger shows that the pathological situation of improper priors or infinite
expectation values has consequences as we merely approach such a situation.
Key words: Recreational mathematics, mathematical paradoxes, Monty Hall problem,
Exchange paradox, Necktie problem, Saint Petersburg paradox
1. TEP-1
1.1. Introduction
Here is the (currently) standard form of the Two Envelopes Problem (TEP), as given by
Falk (2008), who cites Wikipedia for the precise formulation. Wikipedia cites Falk (2008), so
this is kind of frozen now. I will postpone remarks on the (pre-)history of TEP till near the end
of the paper. Writing for probabilists and statisticians I shall move fast through (for us) easy
developments. However on the way I will discuss logicians’, philosophers’, and economists’
approaches and thereby call into question the very assumptions that for “us” probabilists and
statisticians are as natural as the air we breathe, hence taken for granted. Though Bayesians
and frequentists may also live in different worlds.
You are given two indistinguishable envelopes, each of which contains a positive sum of
money. One envelope contains twice as much as the other. You may pick one envelope and
keep whatever amount it contains. You pick one envelope at random but before you open it
you are offered the possibility to take the other envelope instead. Now consider the following
reasoning:
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2 ANNA KARENINA AND THE TWO ENVELOPES
1. I denote by A the amount in my selected envelope.
2. The probability that A is the smaller amount is 1/2, and that it is the larger amount is
also 1/2.
3. The other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2.
4. If A is the smaller amount the other envelope contains 2A.
5. If A is the larger amount the other envelope contains A/2.
6. Thus the other envelope contains 2A with probability 1/2 and A/2 with probability
1/2.
7. So the expected value of the money in the other envelope is (1/2)2A+ (1/2)(A/2) =
5A/4.
8. This is greater than A, so I gain on average by swapping.
9. After the switch, I can denote that content byB and reason in exactly the same manner
as above.
10. I will conclude that the most rational thing to do is to swap back again.
11. To be rational, I will thus end up swapping envelopes indefinitely.
12. As it seems more rational to open just any envelope than to swap indefinitely, we have
a contradiction.
Notice that the problem is not to give a correct proof that there is no point in switching.
The problem, which many authoritative writers admit still defeats them, is to explain what is
wrong with the arguments given above.
For a mathematician it helps to introduce some more notation. I’ll refer to the envelopes
as Envelope A and Envelope B, and the amounts in them as A and B. Let me introduceX to
stand for the smaller of the two amounts and Y to stand for the larger. I think of all four as
being random variables; but this includes the situation that we think ofX and Y as being two
fixed though unknown amounts of money x and y = 2x: a degenerate probability distribution
is also a probability distribution, a constant is also a random variable. It includes the model
of a frequentist statistician who imagines (or has been reliably informed that) the organizer
of this game repeatedly chooses, according to a fixed probability distribution, a new random
amountX to be the smaller of the two; then the other amount is determined as Y = 2X , and
finally by the toss of a fair coin (independent of the two amounts) one is put in Envelope
A and the other in Envelope B, defining random variables A and B. On the other hand, it
also includes the model of a true Bayesian statistician which formally is identical to what I
just described, but where the probability law of the random variableX is her subjective prior
distribution of the unknown, smaller, amount of money in the two envelopes, in one specific
realisation of the game. For her, x is a fixed but unknown positive quantity, and the law of the
artificial random variableX encapsulates her prior beliefs about x. For the frequentist, x is the
actually realised value of a physical random variableX . Both he and she know that Envelope
A is filled by tossing a fair coin and then putting either x or y = 2x in it, and since the calculus
of subjectivist probability is the same as the calculus of frequentist probability (Kolmogorov
rules!), their mathematical models are identical: only their interpretation is different.
So we have four random variablesX , Y , A and B and it is given that Y = 2X > 0 and
that (A,B) = (X,Y ) or (Y,X). The assumption that the envelopes are indistinguishable and
closed and one is picked at random, translates into the assumption that the event {A = X} has
probability 1/2, whatever the amountX ; in other words, the random variableX and the event
{A = X} are independent. And to repeat what I just stated: the notation does not prejudice
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the question whether probability is taken in its subjectivist or frequentist interpretation – do
we use probability to represent our (lack of) knowledge, or do we use probability to represent
chance mechanisms in the real world?
I consider the argument steps 1–12 together with the structural relationships and
probabilistic properties ofA, B,X and Y to be the definition of The Two Envelopes Problem
(TEP), or more precisely, The Original Two Envelopes Problem (TEP-1). Just as a successful
movie may spawn a series of sequels and occasionally even prequels, TEP has done the same.
We must therefore be careful to distinguish between the entire franchise TEP and the original
TEP. Moreover, the original TEP did not come out of thin air, but had a history. Think of
old movies which the public might have forgotten, but the directors of new movies certainly
hadn’t.
The alert probabilist will notice that something is going wrong in steps 6 and 7.
An expectation value is being computed, but how? Is it a conditional expectation or an
unconditional expectation? These are two main interpretations of the intention of the author
of 1–12: the author meant to compute the unconditional expectationE(B), or the conditional
expectation E(B|A). However the author does not reveal his intention so this is pure
guesswork on our side. Curiously, probabilists tend to go for the conditional expectation,
while philosophers think more often that an unconditional expectation was intended. I will
describe the philosopher’s choice (and many layperson’s choice) first.
1.2. The philosopher’s choice
Let’s explore the philosopher’s interpretation first. According to that interpretation we
are aiming at computation of E(B) by conditioning on the two cases separately: X = A
(envelopeA contains the smaller amount of money),X = B (envelope B contains the smaller
amount). If that is so, then the rule which we want to use is
E(B) = P (A = X)E(B | A = X) + P (B = X)E(B | B = X).
The two situations have equal probability 1/2, as mentioned in step 6, and those probabilities
are then substituted, correctly, in step 7. However according to the this interpretation, the
two conditional expectations are screwed up. A correct computation of E(B | A = X) is the
following: conditional on A = X , B is identical to 2X , so we have to computeE(2X | A =
X) = 2E(X | A = X). But we are told that whether or not Envelope A contains the smaller
amountX is independent of the amountsX and 2X , so E(X | A = X) = E(X). Similarly
we find E(B | B = X) = E(X | B = X) = E(X).
Thus the expected values of the amount of money in Envelope B are 2E(X) and
E(X) in the two situations that it contains the larger and the smaller amount. The overall
average is (1/2)2E(X) + (1/2)E(X) = (3/2)E(X). Similarly this is the expected amount
in Envelope A.
The clearest exponents of the philosophers’ diagnosis of the core of the problem are
Schwitzgebel & Dever (2008) who write: “You would expect less in Envelope A if you knew
that it was the envelope with less than you would if you knew it was the envelope with more”.
This is perfectly correct, and I think a very intuitive explanation. In fact, we can easily say
something stronger: the expected amount in the second envelope given it’s the larger of the
two is twice the expected amount given it’s the smaller!
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As many philosophy authors repeat, the resolution of the paradox is that the writer
has committed the sin of equivocation: using the same words to describe different things.
However this is equivocation of somewhat subtle concepts. Taking the subjective Bayesian
interpretation of our model, we are confusing our beliefs about b, the amount in the second
envelope, in the situation where we imagine being informed that it is the larger amount, from
what we imagine our beliefs about it would be if we were to imagine being informed that it is
the smaller amount. And at the same time we are making an even more serious equivocation,
namely of levels: we are confusing expectation values with actual values.
In my opinion the philosopher’s interpretation is very far fetched. However it seems to
be a very common way in which also ordinary lay persons interpret the context and intent of
the writer. There is a very different way to interpret the intention of the writer of steps 6 and
7 which is far more common in the probability literature. Apparently it comes completely
naturally to “us” probabilists and statisticians, while it is far too sophisticated ever to occur
to ordinary folk.
1.3. The probabilist’s choice
Since the answers are expressed in terms of the amount in Envelope A, it also seems
reasonable to suppose that the writer intended to compute E(B | A). Contrary to what many
writers imagine, this in no way implies that our player is actually looking in his envelope. The
point is that he can imagine what his expectation value would be of the contents of Envelope
B, for any particular amount a he might imagine seeing in his own Envelope A, if he were to
take a peek. If it would appear favourable to switch whatever that imaginary amount might
be, then he has no need to peek in his envelope at all: he can decide to switch anyway.
The conditional expectation E(B | A = a) can be computed just as the ordinary
expectation, by averaging over two situations, but the mathematical rule which is being used
is then
E(B | A) = P (A = X | A)E(B | A = X,A) + P (B = X | A)E(B | B = X,A).
If this was the writer’s intention, then in step 7 he correctly substitutes E(B | A = X,A) =
E(2X | A = X,A) = E(2A | A = X,A) = 2A and similarly E(B | B = X,A) = A. But
he also takes P (A = X | A) = 1/2 and P (B = X | A) = 1/2, that is to say, the writer
assumes that the probability that the first envelope is the smaller or the larger doesn’t depend
on how much is in it. But it obviously could do! For instance if the amount of money is
bounded then sometimes one can tell for sure whether Envelope A contains the larger or
smaller amount from knowing how much is in it.
In probabilistic terms, under this interpretation, the writer has mistakenly taken
independence of the event {X = A} from the amount A as the same as the implicitly given
assumption that the event {A = X} is independent of the random variableX .
1.4. The heart of the matter
In probability theory we know that (statistical) independence is symmetric. In particular,
it is equivalent to say thatA is statistically independent of {A = X} and to say that {A = X}
is statistically independent of A. The probabilist’s interpretation of the mess was that the
writer incorrectly assumed {A = X} to be independent ofA. The philosophers Schwitzgebel
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and Dever’s interpretation was that the writer incorrectly assumed A to be independent of
{A = X}.
One point I’m making is that we have no way of knowing what the original writer was
meaning to do. One thing is clear: he is doing probability calculations in a sloppy way. He is
computing an expectation by taking the weighted average of the expectations in two different
situations. Either he gets the expectations right but the weights wrong, or the weights right but
the expectations wrong (or is there a third possibility?). Is he confusing random variables and
possible values they can take? Or conditional expectations and unconditional expectations?
Conditional probabilities and unconditional probabilities? That simply cannot be decided.
TEP-1 has many cores. And these many cores give some reason for the branching family of
variant paradoxes which grew from it.
The analysis so far leads me to the interim conclusion that TEP-1 does not deserve to be
called a paradox (and certainly not an unresolved paradox, as many writers in philosophy
still insist on claiming): it is merely an example of a screwed-up probability calculation
where the writer is not even clear what he is trying to calculate. The mathematics being
used appears to be elementary probability theory, but whatever the writer is intending to do,
he is breaking the standard, elementary rules. Steps 6 and 7 together are inconsistent. One
cannot say that one of the steps is wrong and the other is right. One can offer as diagnosis,
that the inconsistency is caused by the author giving the same names to different things, or
the same symbols to different things. We can’t deduce what he is confusing with what. He
probably is not even aware of the distinctions. (However ... in the next section I will show
that this interim conclusion is hasty. Maybe the writer was smarter than we give him credit
for.)
But first of all I will present a little theorem which ought to be known in the literature,
but which however almost nobody seems to realize is true.
We saw that both philosophers and probabilists both put their finger on essentially the
same point: the random variable A need not be independent of the event {A = X}. We can
say something a whole lot stronger. The random variable A cannot be independent of the
event {A = X}.
Let me make a side remark here, connected to the parenthetical “however” above.
Suppose that the writer of TEP is a subjective Bayesian. The intended interpretation of
the random variables X , Y , A and B is therefore that their joint probability distribution
represents the writer’s prior knowledge or uncertainty about the actual amounts involved.
Denote the actual smaller and large amount as x > 0 and y = 2x, and denote by a and b
the actual amounts in the first and second envelopes. These are fixed, unknown amounts of
money. The probability distribution of X encapsulates the writer’s prior knowledge about x.
From this, his prior knowledge about all four amounts is defined by first defining Y = 2X
and then definingA andB as follows: independently ofX , with probability one half,A = X
and Y = B; with the complementary probability one half, A = Y and B = X . Since the
mathematics I am about to do assumes I am within conventional probability theory, it follows
that I started with a proper probability distribution for X . Our Bayesian does not have an
improper prior. We will return to the possibility of an improper prior in the next section.
Theorem 1. The random variable A cannot be independent of the event {A < B}.
Proof. Suppose to start with that A and B have finite expectation values. Note that
E(A−B | A−B > 0) > 0. That’s the same, since all expectation values are finite, as
c© 2021 Australian Statistical Publishing Association Inc.
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6 ANNA KARENINA AND THE TWO ENVELOPES
E(A | A > B) > E(B | A > B) = E(A | B > A). In the last step we used the symmetry
of the joint distribution of A and B.
Now if the expectation of A depends on whether A > B or B > A then the distribution
of A depends on which is true, or in other words, the random variable A is not stochastically
independent of the event A > B. Equivalently, the event A > B is not independent of the
random variable A.
For the general case, choose some strictly increasing map from the positive real line
to a bounded interval, for instance, arc tangent. Apply this transformation to both A and B
and then apply the argument just given to the transformed variables. The ordering of the
variables is unaffected by the transformation. So we find that the transformed variable A is
not independent of the event {A < B}, and this implies the non-independence of A of this
event.
Note that we only used the symmetry of the distribution of A and B, and the fact that
these variables have positive probability to be different. We did not use their positivity. As
we will see at the end of the paper, this little theorem lies at the heart not only of the two
envelope paradox but also of a whole family of related exchange paradoxes. In every case,
the originators of the paradoxes (or the first to “solve” them) have “explained” the paradox by
doing explicit calculations in a particular case. This always leaves later writers with a feeling
that the paradox has not really been solved. Indeed, just giving one example does not prove a
general theorem. One swallow does not make a summer.
Samet, Samet & Schmeidler (2004) seem to be the only writers on TEP who know the
general theorem. They prove a weaker result in a more general situation: they do not assume
symmetry. Their proof is a little more tricky than ours, but still, not much more than a page
and basically elementary too. When one adds the assumption of symmetry their result gives
ours. Eckhardt (2013) Chapter 8 “TheTwo-Envelopes Problem” has some nice mathematical
results (which I admit that I have not yet digested), which seem to give the same global
messages as this paper.
Our proof showed that for any strictly monotone increasing function g such
that E(g(A)) exists and is finite, E(g(A) | A < B) < E(g(A)) < E(g(A) | A > B).
Approximating a not strictly monotone function by strictly increasing functions and going to
the limit, we obtain the same inequalities only possibly not strict for all monotone increasing
g with E(g(A)) exists and finite. This is the same as saying that the laws of A given
A < B, of A itself, and of A given A > B, are strictly stochastically ordered: for all a
P (A > a | A < B) ≤ P (A > a) ≤ P (A > a | A > B) , with strict inequality for some a.
This observation gives us the following general theorem:
Theorem 2. Suppose A and B are two random variables, unequal with probability 1, and
whose joint distribution is symmetric under exchange of the two variables. Then
P (A < B | A) 6= P (B < A | A);
in other words, for a set of values of A with positive probability,
P (A < B | A = a) 6= P (B < A | A = a).
Also, the laws of A conditional on A < B, unconditional, and conditional on A > B are
strictly stochastically ordered (from small to large); in other words,
P (A > a | A < B) ≤ P (A > a) ≤ P (A > a | A > B) for all a,
c© 2021 Australian Statistical Publishing Association Inc.
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with strict inequality for a with positive probability under the law of A.
Intuitively, P (A < B | A = a) ought to be decreasing in a. Simple examples show that
this is not necessarily true. However it is true in a certain average sense. For any a0, the result
when averaging over a < a0 is never larger than the result when averaging over a ≥ a0,
where the averaging is with respect to the appropriately normalized law of A. To be precise:
E(P (A < B | A) | A < a0) ≥ P (A < B) = 1/2 ≥ E(P (A < B | A)|A ≥ a0)
for all a0, with both inequalities strict for some a0.
The just mentioned average ordering of the conditional probabilities P (A < B | A =
a) and the stochastic ordering of the conditional (given the ordering of A and B) and
unconditional laws ofA are exactly equivalent results, and both are forms of the statement that
the random variable A and the indicator variable of the event {A > B} are strictly positive
orthant dependent. Recall that X and Y are positive orthant dependent if for all x and y,
P (X ≥ x, Y ≥ y) ≥ P (X ≥ x)P (Y ≥ y); I call the dependence strict if there exist x and y
such that the inequality is strict.
2. TEP-2
Just like a great movie, the success of TEP led to several sequels and to a prequel, so
nowadays when we talk about TEP we have to make clear whether we mean the original
movie TEP-I or the whole franchise.
However before introducing TEP-2 proper, I’ll present some intermediate material
belonging formally in TEP-1.
2.1. The totally ignorant Bayesian
Are steps 6 and 7 of the TEP argument really inconsistent? Suppose the author is
actually a Bayesian and the probability distribution she is using for X summarizes her prior
knowledge about this amount of money. Suppose she knows absolutely nothing about it,
except that it is positive. In that case, if she knows nothing aboutX , she knows nothing about
cX , for any positive c. In particular, if we know nothing aboutX then knowingA intuitively
gives us no clue at all as to whether it is X or 2X .
Now, if knowledge (or lack thereof) can be expressed by probability measures, then the
probability measure expressing total ignorance about X and that expressing total ignorance
about cX must be the same, for any c > 0. The only locally boundedmeasures on the positive
half line invariant under multiplication by just two constants c > 0 and c′ > 0, both different
from 1, and such that the ratio of their logarithms is irrational, are those with Lebesgue
density proportional to 1/x. For instance: c = 2 and c′ = e. The only bounded measures on
the positive half line invariant under multiplication by any positive number are those with
density proportional to 1/x.
Probability theorists will now retort that there is no proper probability distribution with
density proportional to 1/x, end of story! However, I think that that is a cheap way out. That a
certain formal mathematical framework for some real world domain (reasoning and decision
making under uncertainty) does not hold a representative of a conceptual object belonging to
that field could just as well be seen as a defect of standard probability theory. In any case,
the standard framework of probability theory does contain arbitrarily close approximations
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to the improper prior. If the author only meant to write that since she knows almost nothing
about X , it then follows that given A, ∆ is pretty certain to be very close to Bernoulli(1/2),
we could not fault steps 6 and 7.
Let me make this reasoning firm and also showwhere it leads to, namely to a whole class
of new TEP paradoxes which I’ll call TEP-2. This is where TEP moves from probability
theory to mathematical economics. But first we stick within (or very close to) probability
theory.
SupposeX has the probability distribution with density c/x on the interval [ǫ,M ], zero
outside. An easy calculation shows that the proportionality constant is c = 1/ log(M/ǫ).
From this we find that the joint distribution of (A,∆) has density c/(2x) on [ǫ,M ]/× {0} ∪
[2ǫ, 2M ]× {0} and hence the conditional distribution of ∆ given A is Bernoulli(1/2) for
A = a ∈ [2ǫ,M ], while it is degenerate for a ∈ [ǫ, 2ǫ) ∪ (M, 2M ]. Note that the probability
that the distribution of∆ givenA is not Bernoulli(1/2) converges to zero as ǫ→ 0,M →∞.
Similarly, the discrete uniform distribution on 2k, k = −M, ..., N has this property as
M,N →∞, and can be seen as an approximation to the improper prior which is uniform on
all integer powers (positive and negative) of 2.
Let me give an elementary proof characterizing all probability distributions (proper
or improper) such that A and ∆ are independent. This seems to me to be much more
constructive than giving a proof showing that no proper probability distribution exists with
this property (I found such a proof in the literature but have mislaid the reference). However,
since I am working with improper as well as proper distributions I have to be a bit careful
with probability theory: I move to measure theory, supposing X is “distributed” according
to a measure on (0,∞). We understand, I am sure, what I mean by supposing that ∆ is
Bernoulli(1/2), independently of X , and now I can define (A,∆) as function of (X,∆)
and this generates an image measure on the range of (A,∆) which is simply a copy of
half of the original improper distribution of X on (0,∞)× {0} together with half of the
original improper distribution of 2X on (0,∞)× {1}. We assume that this measure exhibits
independence between A and ∆. But that simply means that the improper distributions of
X and of 2X are identical. Taking logarithms to base 2 the improper distributions on the
whole real line of log2X and of 1 + log2X are identical. The distribution of log2X is
invariant under a shift of size +1 and hence under all integer shifts. Such measures are easy
to characterize: place an arbitrary measure on the interval [0, 1) and glue together all integer
shifts of this measure to a measure on the real line. In semi-probabilistic terms, now using
{.} to denote the fractional part of a real number, {log2(X)} and ⌊log2(X)⌋ are independent,
with the integer part being uniformly distributed over all integers, and the fractional part
having an arbitrary distribution.
It would be nice to show that all probability distributions of X which have ∆ and
A approximately independent, are approximately of this form. The crux of the matter is
therefore to choose meaningful notions of both instances of “approximate”. Also, it would
be nice to get rid of the special dependence on the number 2. We could just as well have
formulated the two envelopes problem using any other factor, at least, large enough to make
exchange seem attractive. If a measure on the real line is invariant under all shifts then it has
to be uniform. If it is invariant under two relatively irrational shifts then it is uniform. If it is
locally bounded and invariant under all rational shifts it is uniform.
So far I only succeeded in deriving some partial results, and will stick with the original
problem with the special role of 2.
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Theorem 3. Consider a sequence of probability measures of the random variable X such
that A and∆ are asymptotically independent in the sense that the conditional law of∆ given
A converges weakly to Bernoulli(1/2). Then the total variation distance between the laws of
log2(X) and 1 + log2(X), which is of course equal to the total variation distance between
the laws ofX and 2X , converges to zero.
Conversely, convergence of the total variation distance between the laws of X and 2X
to zero, implies the asymptotic independence of A and∆.
Corollary 1. supk P (⌊log2X⌋ = k)→ 0.
Corollary 2. The distance between any two (different) quantiles of the law of X converges
to infinity.
Corollary 3. For all δ > 0, P (X < δE(X))→ 1.
Conjecture 1. A and ∆ are asymptotically independent if and only if fractional and whole
parts of log2X are asymptotically independent, with the whole part asymptotically uniformly
distributed over all integers.
Examples. Suppose X is continuously uniformly distributed on the interval [1, N ]. For
a ∈ [2, N/2], the conditional probability that A < B given A = a is exactly equal to 1/2.
Outside that interval it is equal to 0 or 1. As N increases the probability of the event
A ∈ [2, N/2] converges to 1/4. SoA and∆ are not asymptotically independent. The variation
distance between the laws ofX and 2X converges to 1/2. Theorem 2 does not apply, though
the statement of the first corollary is true, and hence also of the next two. On the other
hand, if we take log2X continuously uniformly distributed on [0, N ], then the asymptotic
independence does hold and hence the theorem applies, and also its corollaries. If we replace
the continuous uniform distributions by the discrete, the same things can be said. All this is
consistent with Conjecture 1.
Remark 1. Corollary 3 is going to be used to resolve the (still to be introduced) TEP-2
paradox. As the proof will show, Corollary 3 is a corollary of Corollary 2, which follows
from Corollary 1, which follows from the theorem (forwards implication).
Remark 2. Conjecture 1 as it stands is ill-posed. Part of the problem is to extend probability
theory and then weak convergence theory to include improper prior distributions and allow
them to arise as “weak limits” in the new, appropriate sense. The first thing to do is to study
more examples.
Proof of Theorem 3, forward implication. To say that the conditional law of ∆ given A
converges weakly to the constant law Bernoulli(1/2) means precisely that for any ǫ > 0 and δ
there exists an N0(ǫ, δ) such that for all N ≥ N0, P (
∣∣P (∆ = 1 | A)− 1
2
∣∣ > ǫ) ≤ δ. Recall
that everything is defined here through the law ofX which is supposed to depend on N . For
all N , ∆ is independent of X and Bernoulli(1/2), and A = X if ∆ = 0, A = 2X if ∆ = 1.
Now if
∣∣P (∆ = 1 | A)− 1
2
∣∣ ≤ ǫ then P (∆ = 0 | A)/P (∆ = 1 | A) ≤ (1 + 2ǫ)/(1− 2ǫ) =
c, say. Define Z = log2X , let 1 denote an indicator random variable. We have for all E,
P (Z ∈ E) = 2P (log2A ∈ E,∆ = 0) ≤ 2
(
δ + P
(
log2A ∈ E,∆ = 0,
P (∆ = 0 | A)
P (∆ = 1 | A)
≤ c
))
≤ 2δ + 2E
(
P (∆ = 0 | A)1{log2A ∈ E,
P (∆ = 0 | A)
P (∆ = 1 | A)
≤ c)}
)
c© 2021 Australian Statistical Publishing Association Inc.
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≤ 2δ + 2cE
(
P (∆ = 1 | A)1{log2A ∈ E,
P (∆ = 0 | A)
P (∆ = 1 | A)
≤ c)}
)
≤ 2δ + 2cE
(
P (∆ = 1 | A)1{log2A ∈ E}
)
≤ 2δ + 2cP (log2A ∈ E,∆ = 1)
= 2δ + 2cP (Z + 1 ∈ E,∆ = 1)
= 2δ +
1 + 2ǫ
1− 2ǫ
P (Z + 1 ∈ E).
It follows that
P (Z ∈ E)− P (Z + 1 ∈ E) ≤ 2δ + 4ǫ/(1− 2ǫ).
On the other hand, reversing the roles of the events {∆ = 0} and {∆ = 1}, and starting from
the identity P (Z + 1 ∈ E) = 2P (log2A ∈ E,∆ = 1), we obtain in exactly the same way
P (Z + 1 ∈ E)− P (Z ∈ E) ≤ 2δ + 4ǫ/(1− 2ǫ).
Since E was arbitrary this proves the claim that the total variation distance between the laws
of Z and of Z + 1 converges to zero.
Proof of Theorem 3, reverse implication. This proof is left to the reader. It requires careful
choice of two different sets E, for instance, E+ = {a : P (∆ = 1 | A = a) > 1/2 + ǫ} for
some ǫ > 0, and E− = {a : P (∆ = 1 | A = a) < 1/2− ǫ} .
Proof of Corollary 1. If k0 maximizes P (⌊Z⌋ = k) then applying the theorem m times
we have the asymptotic equality of P (⌊Z⌋ = k0), P (⌊Z⌋+ 1 = k0), ...P (⌊Z⌋+m = k0).
This implies that lim supP (⌊Z⌋ = k0) ≤ 1/(m+ 1). Since m was arbitrary, it follows that
maxk P (⌊Z⌋ = k)→ 0.
Proof of Corollary 2. It is obvious from Corollary 1, that the distance between two fixed
(distinct) quantiles of the distribution of Z must diverge as N →∞.
Proof of Corollary 3. Let zα denote the upper α-quantile of the law of Z = log2X , defined
by P (Z ≥ zα) ≥ α, P (Z > zα) < α. Fix ǫ > 0. On the one hand,
P (X ≤ 2zǫ) > 1− ǫ.
On the other hand,
E(X) = E(2Z) ≥
ǫ
2
2zǫ/2 =
ǫ
2
2zǫ/2−zǫ2zǫ .
Since zǫ/2 − zǫ →∞, it follows that for sufficiently large N , δE(X) > 2
zǫ and hence
P (X < δE(X)) > 1− ǫ.
2.2. TEP-2 proper: Great Expectations
Now for TEP-2 proper, and a shift to some issues much discussed in mathematical
economics and decision theory. It was quickly observed that steps 6 and 7 can’t both be
correct if we restrict attention to X having a proper probability distribution. (As I just
explained, I consider that observation to be a cheap way to resolve the TEP-1). However,
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it also did not take long for many authors to discover probability distributions ofX such that
E(B | A = a) > a for all a, or more concisely,E(B | A) > A. Thus the paradox appears to
be resurrected since there are situations in which it appears rational to exchange envelopes
without knowledge of the content of your envelope. Here is just one such example: let X be
2 to the power of a geometrically distributed random variable with parameter p = 1/3; to be
precise, P (X = 2n) = 2n/3n+1, n = 0, 1, 2.... WhenA = 1, with certainlyA < B. For any
other possible value of A it turns out that P (A < B | A) = 3/5 and E(B | A) = 11A/10 >
A except when A = 1, when E(B | A) = 2 > A.
Equally quickly, it was noticed that such examples always had E(X) =∞. This is
necessary, since on taking expectation values again, it follows from E(B | A) > A that
E(B) > E(A) ... or that E(B) = E(A) =∞. But we know a priori (by symmetry) that
E(B) = E(A), and indeed E(B) = E(A) = 3E(X)/2 since the expected amount in both
envelopes together is 3E(X). Hence all such examples must indeed have E(X) =∞.
Why does this observation resolve the paradox? Well, because if the expectation
values of A and B are infinite, you will always be disappointed with what you get, on
choosing and opening either envelope. As Keynes famously said, in the long run we are
dead. Why are expectation values supposed to be interesting? Because they are supposed to
approximate long run averages. But if the infinitely long run average is infinite, any finite
average is disappointing. In the mathematical economics literature, as well as our probability
distributions expressing our beliefs we have our utilities expressing our value to be assigned to
any outcome. Standard economic theory assumes that utilities are bounded. That is supposed
to keep paradoxes from the door.
Well, that is the point of view in mathematical economics. Again, I think it is a too
cheap way out. In mathematical models it is often perfectly justified to use probability
distributions with infinite ranges, and even with infinite expectation values, as convenient,
realistic, legitimate mathematical approximations to real life distributions, even though some
would insist that all “real” distributions actually have bounded support and definitely finite
expectation value. The point is, that that point is irrelevant. The fields of mathematical
finance, climatology, meteorology, geophysics abound with examples. The important point
is the fact that in the real world it is quite possible for averages of a number of independent
observations of X to be always far less than the mathematical expectation value of X with
overwhelming probability. Take a distribution of X on the positive real line with infinite
expectation and leading toE(B | A) > A and truncate it so far to the right that even a million
independent observations from X would hardly ever contain one observation exceeding the
truncation value. Call the truncated distribution that of X ′ and use it instead of X to set up
TEP-2. You’ll findE(B | A) > Awith huge probability so step 8 suggests you should switch
envelopes. But the gain is illusory, since this is a situation where the average of a huge number
of copies of X is still far smaller than their expectation value. Expectation value is no guide
to decision, even though everything is as finite as you like.
Some philosophers working on the margins of the foundations of the theory of utility
do write papers trying to set up a theory of utility which allows unbounded utilities, and use
TEP-2 as a test case for such theories. For the reasons just expressed, I think they are barking
up a completely wrong tree.
This is where I also return to my intermediate (between TEP-1 and TEP-2) resolution:
the author was perhaps a Bayesian using a prior distribution perfectly appropriate to express
almost complete lack of knowledge about X . Corollary 3 says that as she must admit to
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having a tiny bit of information, steps 6 and 7 are only approximately correct, not exactly, but
now the resolution of the paradox is that in this situation the expectation value ofX is so far
to the right of where the bulk of its probability distribution lies, that expectation values are
no guide to action. It is step 8 which fails. This is a situation where Keynes has the last word.
Back to TEP-1: since the writer is not working explicitly in a particular formal
framework, we do not know what he or she is trying to do. There is not a unique resolution
to the paradox of the type “step so-and-so fails”. There is not a unique explanation of “what
went wrong”. Looking for one is illusory. Unless we take the higher point of view and say: the
writer was trying to do probability theory but without knowing its concepts, let alone its rules,
and he or she screwed up big time by not making distinctions which in probability theory are
crucial to make. TEP-1 is the kind of reason that formal probability theory was invented.
Philosophers who work on TEP-1 without knowing modern (elementary) probability are
largely wasting their own time; at best they will reinvent the wheel.
3. TEP-3
Next we start analysing the situation when we do look in Envelope A before deciding
whether to switch or stay. If there is a given probability distribution of X this just becomes
an exercise in Bayesian probability calculations. Typically there is a threshhold value above
which we do not switch. But all kinds of strange things can happen. If a probability
distribution of X is not given we come to the randomized solution of Cover (1987) where
we compareA to a random “probe” of our own choosing.
Here is the problem, in Cover’s words: Player 1 writes down any two distinct numbers
on separate slips of paper. Player 2 randomly chooses one of these slips of paper and looks
at the number. Player 2 must decide whether the number in his hand is the larger of the two
numbers. He can be right with probability one-half, by just guessing. It seems absurd that he
can do better.
Spoiler alert. How can he do better? (Cover does not give the answer, but he does know
that there is one). Here it is. Player 2 picks a number with a positive probability density
with respect to Lebesgue measure on the real line. For any non-empty interval, there is
positive probability that it lies in that interval. Hence there is positive probability that it lies
between the two numbers written down by Player 1. Now Player 2 uses his random number
as surrogate for “the other number”. He’ll give the right answer when his own number is in
between Player 1’s numbers, but when his number is outside of the range of Player 1’s two
numbers, he guesses right with probability one half. His overall probability of getting it right
is strictly larger than a half.
4. TEP-0
This is of course the “TEP without probability” of Smullyan (1992). Let the amount
in the envelope chosen by the player be A. By swapping, the player may gain A or lose
A/2. So the potential gain is strictly greater than the potential loss. But let the amounts in
the envelopes be X and 2X . Now by swapping, the player may gain X or lose X . So the
potential gain is equal to the potential loss.
The short resolution is simply: the problem is using the same words (potential gain,
loss) to describe different things. But different resolutions are possible depending on what
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one thinks was the intention of the writer. One can try to embed the argument(s) into
counterfactual reasoning. Or one also can point out that the key information that Envelope A
is chosen at random is not being used in Smullyan’s arguments. So this is a problem in logic
and this time an example of screwed up logic. Philosophers have lots of ways to clean up this
particular mess.
5. History
So far I neglected to mention that TEP was a remake of the 1953 two-neckties
problem, Kraitchik (1953), of Maurice Kraitchik (1882-1957), a Belgian mathematician and
populariser of mathematics born in Minsk. An earlier (1943) edition of Kraitchik’s book
“Mathematical recreations” exists, I do not know if that one already contains the problem.
Two men are each given a necktie by their respective wives as a Christmas present. Over
drinks they start arguing over who has the cheaper necktie. They agree to have a wager over
it. They will consult their wives and find out which necktie is more expensive. The terms of the
bet are that the man with the more expensive necktie has to give it to the other as the prize.
The first man reasons as follows: winning and losing are equally likely. If I lose, then I lose
the value of my necktie. But if I win, then I win more than the value of my necktie. Therefore,
the wager is to my advantage. The second man can consider the wager in exactly the same
way; thus, paradoxically, it seems both men have the advantage in the bet. This is obviously
not possible (assuming both prefer the more expensive necktie).
Kraitchik’s main interests were the theory of numbers and recreational mathematics.
The two neckties became two wallets with Gardner (1982) and two envelopes with Zabell
(1988a), Zabell (1988b), Nalebuff (1988), Nalebuff (1989) and Gardner (1989). Zabell gave
the wide class of problems the name exchange paradox. He explains that he heard of the
problem from Steve Budrys of the Odesta corporation, and also that he discussed it with lots
of other people. Nalebuff tells that he got it from Hal Varian who got it from Sandy Zabell.
Zabell (a subjective Bayesian) starts with introducing a third player, Player C, who fills the
two envelopes and gives one to Player A and one to Player B. We are not initially told that C
does this “at random”. Hence the other players’ prior beliefs about Player C would certainly
influence their own decisions. Zabell does go on to focus on the symmetric case that player
C is known to be a neutral referee. Nalebuff focussed on a non-symmetric version now called
the Ali and Baba problem. Since my focus is on the symmetric case I do not write out the
(simple) details here. He neatly retains the paradox that both Ali and Baba, after imagining
looking in their envelopes, seem to have a good reason to want to switch with the other. A
possible ancestry goes back to a problem proposed by Schro¨dinger, quoted in Littlewood
(1953). A highly disguised appearance of the paradox occurred in Blackwell (1951). So in
the movie paradigm, TEP is actually a remake of an almost forgotten classic.
All the symmetric versions of the problem have exactly the same key feature and the
same resolution: there is a pair of random variables A, B whose distribution is invariant
under exchange. They have positive probability to be different; on conditioning that they
are different, we may pretend they are certainly different. Hence by our little Theorem 2 at
the end of Section 1, the random variable A cannot be independent of the event {A < B},
or equivalently, the event {A < B} cannot be independent of the random variable A. Or ...
there is an improper prior lurking behind the scenes, expectations are infinite, and exchange
is futile.
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6. Conclusions
Over the years, frequentist probabilists, Bayesian probabilists, logicians, philosophers,
and mathematical economists, have all taken a too narrow view of TEP, blind to the existence
of other scientific communities. Obviously, the present author is the first to step outside of
the narrow confines of their own discipline! Since probability calculus was invented so as to
provide a decent language to enable the world to move on from problems like TEP, why do
so many philosophers still insist on clumsy pre-probability “solutions” which are so vague
as to be useless? But how come Martin Gardner couldn’t solve TEP? And why did so many
biggish names deduce that X must have a uniform distribution on (0,∞), while in fact it’s
logX which must be uniform on (−∞,∞), to preserve the validity of steps 6 and 7 (if the
special number “2” is made arbitrary)? Why did so many authors take a cheap way out to
resolve the paradox? It’s clear that most people find TEP irritating. It is not a fun problem
like MHP (Monty Hall problem).
I hope this paper shows that there are both subtle and fascinating aspects to TEP and
probably even some more interesting maths, if not philosophy, to be done. I did not succeed
in showing that limiting independence of A and ∆ implied that ⌊log2X⌋ is asymptotically
uniform and asymptotically independent of {log2X}. I could not do this because I don’t
yet have a way to express formally what I want to prove, since in the limit I am outside of
conventional probability theory.
There are certainly some important lessons to people who build probability models in
the real world. One should be wary of infinities, but please let’s be wary of them for the good
reasons, not for non-reasons.
I think it helps a great deal to bear the Anna Karenina principle in mind, when tackling
a logical paradox like TEP. Note that the TEP argument is informal. Steps are partly justified,
but not fully justified. In order to “point a finger” at the mistake, the steps need to be amplified.
But why should there only be one way to amplify the steps of the argument so as to fit in to
some logical – but failing – argument? And why should the failed argument only fail at
one step? The writer does not make explicit within which logical framework he is working.
We neither know his assumptions nor his intention. Whatever they are, he must be making
a mistake, since his conclusion is self-contradictory. But one cannot say that whatever the
context and whatever the intention, the mistake is made at the same place. It is hard to be sure
that there are no other reasonable contexts and intentions than those which have appeared
so far in the literature. As the paradox evolved and migrated to new fields it mutated as
well: from its humble origin in recreational mathematics (where it was invented by experts in
number theory so as to confuse amateurs) it mutated and migrated to statistics, mathematical
economics and to philosophy.
I also found the Anna Karenina principle very useful when arguing with researchers in
the foundations of quantummechanics, who believe that Bell’s theorem is false. The theorem
in question states that quantum mechanics is incompatible with “local realism” – the world
view of Einstein. The theorem, or a formal mathematical version of it, is clearly correct, and
it has stood up to more than fifty years of intense scrutiny and much opposition. Again and
again, very smart people come up with counterexamples. There is always a mistake in their
counter-example, but they will always deny that that is a mistake. Like a persistent student,
they will rewrite their manuscript adding new technical detail correcting the mistake they had
made before, and hiding a new one buried deeper still in long computations. For some nice
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open probability problems in this field with distinctly geometric flavour, and not needing any
knowledge of quantum mechanics, see Gill (2020).
I find the analogy with the Aliens movie franchise also useful. TEP tells us how
important it is to make distinctions. People who write about TEP should be careful to
distinguish TEP-1 from the whole franchise. We have this whole franchise precisely because
of the Anna Karenina principle. Anna Karenina meets Aliens on the back of a few envelopes.
I am looking forward to new papers on TEP, if necessary shredding my own. Arrogance
deserves to be punished.
The bibliography to this paper contains a list of all the papers I have studied while
writing this one. Many are not cited in the body of this paper, but they have all influenced in
one way or another the whole paper. Many of the books are listed with their date of original
publication, but with the publisher which presently provides a “second (or later) edition”.
I first started working on this topic through getting involved in Wikipedia discussions, or
perhaps one could better say, fights, which somewhat like many court cases (especially in civil
law, but also in criminal law) were typically resolved in favour of editors who could recite at
length from the Wikipedia rule book while blind drunk if not asleep. Logic or truth are not
criteria which aWikipedia editor is allowed to use. Instead, the key notions to justify inclusion
are “reliable source”, “notability”, and “neutral point of view”. Elementary arithmetic is
allowed, but elementary logic is disqualified as being “own research”. Anyway, I’m especially
indepted to the Wikipedia editor “iNic” who maintains an extensive bibliography on a
Wikipedia talk page
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Two_envelopes_problem/Literature.
I particularly like the quote he gives, from Syverson (2010), “Indeed if there is anything
inherently unbounded about the two-envelope paradox, it is that each search will uncover at
least one more reference”.
The Wikipedia page on TEP is still (March 2020) problematic. Please cite my present
paper in many future peer-reviewed publications by yourself, in order that it may become an
authoritative source for future wikipedia editors.
Almost absent are papers on the quantum two envelope problem. This is surprising in
view of the rich literature on quantum versions of MHP (the Monty Hall or three doors
problem), in particular D’Ariano et al. (2002). And what led Schro¨dinger to the problem?
The interesting paper Ergodos (2014) at least mentions the possibility of a quantum TEP. A
recent discovery which I have yet to digest is Cheong, Saakian & Zadourian (2017).
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